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DOUGLAS E. BAGLEY,

]

Case No.

900454 -- CA

Defendant and Respondent.;
Priority 16
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
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FREDERICK, PRESIDING.

I.
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court by virtue of
plaintiff having appealed from the District Court of Utah to
the Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-2(j) (1953,
as amended 1989).

The Supreme Court referred this case to the

Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953, as
amended 1990) .
1

II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in interpreting the language

of the parties' contract such that defendant was not
personally obligated to pay plaintiff the sums due and owing
thereunder?
2*

Did the trial court commit reversible error in not

determining a genuine issue of material fact was raised by the
Affidavits filed by defendant, plaintiff and Rene Taylor?
3.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in

denying plaintiff's Motion to Amend his Complaint on the basis
that the Court had granted defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment by Minute Entry, despite the fact that the unopposed
Motion to Amend was filed prior to the trial court's Minute
Entry?
III.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following Constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances and/or rules are applicable to the case on appeal
and each of the following are set forth verbatim in the
Addendum submitted herewith:
1.

Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2

2.

Rule 56(a) & (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure.
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to collect unpaid sums alleged to be
due and owing by defendant pursuant to a written promissory
note.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND

DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on August 28, 1989.
(R.0001)

Defendant's counsel served a Motion a Dismiss on

September 15, 1989, but did not file the same with the court.
The trial court denied defendant's Motion and awarded
plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees of $250.00 on October 26,
1989.

(R.0020)

On November 9, 19 89, the trial court entered

an order denying defendant's Motion, ordering defendant to
answer plaintiff's Complaint within ten (10) days of entry of
the order and awarding plaintiff fees as set forth above.
(R.0021-23)
Defendant failed to answer the Complaint and a Default
Certificate was entered on November 29, 1989.

(R.0024-25)

Defendant filed his Answer on November 31, 1989.
3

(R.0026)

On

December 1, 1989, plaintiff filed his Notice of Intent to File
Default Judgment.

(R.0028)

On December 13, 1989, defendant

filed a Motion and Memorandum to Set Aside Default
Certificate.

(R.0036)

Plaintiff filed a response to

defendant's Motion with an Affidavit of counsel on December
18, 1989.

(R.0040-53)

The Court granted defendant's Motion

by order dated January 19, 1990.

(R.0059)

Plaintiff served discovery requests upon defendant on
January 26, 1990.

(R.0061)

On March 7, 1990, plaintiff filed

a Motion for Summary Judgment, with accompanying Memorandum of
Points and Authorities, based upon defendant's responses to
the foregoing discovery requests.

(R.0069-0145)

On March 19,

19 90, defendant filed a cross Motion for Summary Judgment with
accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities.
0153)

(R. 0146-

Defendant also filed an Affidavit in Opposition to

plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

(R.0154-0156)

On

March 22, 1990, plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike defendant's
Affidavit with an accompanying Memorandum of Points and
Authorities.

(R. 0157-0164)

On March 29, 1990, plaintiff

filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, together with
Affidavits of Plaintiff and Rene Taylor, concerning the
preparation and intent of plaintiff regarding the promissory
4

note.

(R.0175-0185)

Plaintiff also served a Motion to Amend

(R.0195) concurrent with the responsive pleadings to
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, but the same was not
filed (due to lack of filing fee) until April 3, 1990.
(R.0188)

Plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint, that was

filed with the Motion, asserted a Second Cause of Action
against defendant based upon piercing the corporate veil.
Defendant did not oppose plaintiff's Motion to Amend.
The Motions for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike the
Affidavit of Defendant Bagley were submitted for decision
pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.

On April 10, 1990, the Court, in an unsigned

Minute Entry, granted plaintiff's Motion to Strike defendant's
Affidavit to the extent the same related to defendant's
understanding or intent; denied plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment; and granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
(R.0206)
On April 16, 1990, plaintiff filed a Notice to Submit for
Decision regarding plaintiff's Motion to Amend.

(R.0207)

On

April 18, 1990, the trial court denied plaintiff's Motion to
Amend in an unsigned Minute Entry for the reason that the
Court had previously granted defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment on April 10, 1990.

(R.0209)
5

The Order granting

defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was entered on April
23f

1990.

(R.Q21Q-211)

The Order denying plaintiff's Motion

to Amend was entered on May 9, 1990

(R.0212-213)

filed his Notice of Appeal on May 23, 1990.
Co

Plaintiff

(R.0214-215)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case involved interpretation of the following
promissory note that is set out, in toto, as follows:

"Forty-five (45) days after date, for value
received, I/we jointly and severally, promise to pay
to Rene Taylor, agent for Lorenzo Jones Taylor or
order Fifty-eight Thousand Dollars with interest
payable Dec. 20, 1984 at the rate of 14% per annum
from No.v(sic) 6, 1984 until paid. The holder shall
have the right to declare this note due for default
in payment of interest.
Oncor Sound, Inc.
/s/Douglas E. Baqley
President"
A factual dispute exists between the parties as to their
intent with respect to personal liability as well as the issue
of who drafted the note.

The Affidavits submitted by

plaintiff (R.0175-180) assert defendant drafted the note while
defendant's Affidavit (R.0154-155) asserts plaintiff's son,
Rene Taylor, either drafted the note or had the same drafted
by an attorney.

6

V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant drafted a promissory note in favor of plaintiff
containing the following phrase:

"I/we jointly and severally

promise to pay to... Lorenzo Taylor Jones...."

Plaintiff

maintains that the foregoing contractual language can only be
interpreted to impose personal liability on defendant inasmuch
as only one signature is affixed to the note.

Plaintiff

maintains that the trial court ignored the foregoing
contractual language by failing to impose personal liability
upon defendant.

As such, plaintiff maintains the lower court

erred in that it effectively rewrote the parties' agreement
so as to eliminate the joint and several language in the note.
The trial court erred in granting defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment where the Affidavits submitted by plaintiff
evidenced a clear intent to hold defendant personally liable
and defendant admits a discussion concerning his personal
liability on the note was had between himself and plaintiff's
agent.

As such, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was

improperly granted inasmuch the contract in question was not
an integrated contract and genuine issues of material fact
existed, precluding summary judgment.
Finally, the trial court erred in holding that
7

plaintiff's unopposed Motion to Amend was barred by the
court's granting of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
where no order had been entered as of the date the Motion to
Amend was ruled upon.

As such, the case was not dismissed

and the court committed reversible error in so holding.
VI.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BECAUSE THE CONTRACTUAL PHRASE "I/WE
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, PROMISE TO PAY..."
RENDERS DEFENDANT PERSONALLY LIABLE TO
PLAINTIFF. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
An appellate court reviews summary judgments for
correctness "without according deference to the trial court's
legal conclusions", Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah
1989) (citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988)).
Moreover, the interpretation of the parties' agreement is a
question of law and the trial court's construction of the
contract will be given no deference.
P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980).

Jones v. Hinkle, 611

Finally, an agreement should be

construed as a whole with all of the terms to "be given effect
if it is reasonably practicable to do so".
omitted).
8

Id., (citations

It has been held that "use of the pronoun 'we' usually
creates a joint obligation,•., " 17 Am, Jur. 2d 718,
Contracts, Section 298, and "a promise in the plural is
prima-facie joint."

Fidelity Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bismarck

Invest. Corp., 547 P.2d 212, 214 (Utah 1976) (citations
omitted).

Moreover, the obligee is not required to pursue all

joint obligors because
"...if judgment were taken against all who
were jointly obligated, the judgment
creditor could get satisfaction from any
one of the debtors. The one who was
compelled to pay the joint obligation
would have his rights to have contribution
against his joint obligors, and this would
be true whether the judgment was against
them or not." Ld. at 214. (Emphasis
added).
Finally, the effect of a joint and several obligation is
that:
"Parties having a 'joint and several'
obligation are bound jointly as one party,
and also severally as separate parties at
the same time and a joint and several
contract is a contract with each promisor
and a joint contract with all." Morgan &
Oswood Const. Co, Inc. v. U. S. Fidelity
and Guaranty Co., 535 P.2d 170, 172
(Montana 1975).
In the case at bar, the defendant has admitted he freely
and voluntarily signed an unambiguous contract that "I/we
jointly and severally promise to pay to... Lorenzo Jones
Taylor..."

The foregoing language "must be followed by the
9

Court," Federal Deposit Ins. Corp, at 214, and leads to only
one conclusion —

the defendant is personally liable for

payment of the Note as a joint and several obligor with Oncor
Sound, Inc.
The trial court apparently adopted defendant's argument,
however, that the promissory note was executed solely in a
corporate capacity.

In so doing, the lower court had to

simply ignore the joint and several language of the agreement
because the trial court struck defendant's Affidavit to the
extent defendant asserted his intent.

By striking defendant's

Affidavit, the trial court must have determined the note to be
unambiguous and that the contract must be interpreted solely
on the language contained therein.

The lower court, however,

interpreted the agreement without construing all of the terms
of the agreement.

See, Jones, supra.

The trial court

therefore committed reversible error by denying plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff respectfully requests

this Court to reverse and remand this matter to the District
Court for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff pursuant to
his Motion for Summary Judgment.
II.
PLAINTIFF, ALTERNATIVELY, ASSERTS THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE
TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT CANNOT BE
10

RECONCILED ON ITS FACE THEREBY RENDERING
THE SAME AMBIGUOUS AND GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACT EXIST PRECLUDING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
A trial court must not assess credibility or weigh
evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment and M[a]
single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of
fact."

Webster vs, Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983).

The Plaintiff submittted his own affidavit as well as
that of his son, Rene Taylor, stating that the Defendant
drafted the agreement and the intent of the agreement was to
hold Defendant personally liable.

Defendant acknowledged, at

paragraph 6 of his affidavit (R.0155), that a discussion was
had concerning his personal liability on the note but
controverted the affidavits filed in behalf of Plaintiff by
stating he did not agree to be personally bound.

Rene

Taylor's affidavit, at paragraph 3 (R.0176), denies the
statments of Defendant and asserts Defendant was to be
personally liable.
Thus, a dispute existed as to the issue of personal
liability and the affidavits of the parties must be construed
to mean that the parties' agreement was not a fully integrated
and complete agreement.

As such, the trial court should have

considered the parol evidence submitted by the parties.
Union Bank vs. Swenson, 707 p.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985).
11

See,

Moreover, parol evidence is admissable to clarify a facial
ambiguity in an agreement, id., and it is plainly evident that
the trial judge failed to consider the affidavits submitted by
Plaintiff.

Plaintiff therefore submits that a genuine issue

of material fact existed that should have precluded granting
of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S UNOPPOSED MOTION TO AMEND.
The lower court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Amend
because the court had promulgated a minute entry granting
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment prior to ruling on
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend.

The trial court apparently

relied on the cases of Steiner vs. State, 495 P.2d 809 (Utah
1972) and Nichols vs. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976).

The

trial court's reliance on these decisions is misplaced and
warrants reversal.
Both Steiner and Nichols involved similar fact situations
in which the plaintiff's case was dismissed, an order was
formally entered thereon and the plaintiff then filed a motion
to amend several months after entry of the order of dismissal.
The facts at bar are significantly different, to-wit:

the

Motion to Amend was filed before any ruling on the merits had
occurred and the ruling on the Motion to Amend was decided
12

before entry of any order dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint.
Neither Steiner nor Nichols is analgous to the case at bar and
do not constitute good precedent to support the trial judge's
ruling.
A case more closely on point is Lone Star Motor Import,
Inc., vs. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69 (5th Circ. 1961).
In Lone Star, plaintiff brought suit for breach of contract.
The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and
the lower court ruled from the bench by granting defendant's
motion.

Plaintiff filed a motion to amend after the ruling

but before entry of the order granting defendant's motion to
dismiss.

The trial judge denied the motion to amend.

The

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that denying
the motion to amend would unduly prejudice the plaintiff
without any comparable showing of prejudice to the defendant.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit remanded with instructions to grant
plaintiff leave to amend.
In the case at bar, Defendant cannot show any prejudice
because Defendant did not claim any prejudice.

In fact,

Defendant did not even respond to Plaintiff's Motion!
Clearly, Plaintiff is being prejudiced by not being able to
pursue legal theories available to him whereas Defendant
suffers no prejudice.

Moreover, the Lone Star decision is
13

factually analgous because an unsigned minute entry is not a
final order under Utah law.

See, Wisden vs. City of Salina,

69 6 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1985)(unsigned minute entry granting
summary judgment is not a final judgment).

Plaintiff

therefore urges this Court to adopt the Lone Star decision and
apply it to the case at bar by reversing and remanding with
instructions to grant Plaintiff leave to file his Amended
Complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff asserts the trial court erred in denying
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as well as denying
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend.

Accordingly, Plaintiff requests

this matter be remanded for entry of judgment in favor of
Plaintiff as prayed in his Motion for Summary Judgment or,
alternatively, an order remanding this matter to the trial
court with instructions to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his
complaint as prayed in his Motion to Amend.
Dated this

/?

day of ^ L ^ ^ ^ c l , 1990.
Respectfully submitted,

Phillip W. Dye]
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
k/mi/Taylor.bri/APPl
14

ADDENDUM

$58.000.00

November 6, 1984

Forty-five (45) days after date, for value received, I/we
jointly and severally, promise to pay to Rene Taylor, agent
for Lorenzo Jones Taylor or order Fifty-eight'/Thousand Dollars
with interest payable Dec. 20, 1984 at the rate of 14% per
annum from No.v 6, 1984 until paid. The holder shall have the
right to declare this note due for default in payment of
interest.

Opcor Sound, Inc. f

000CG

APPLICABLE RULES OF PROCEDURE
Rule 15. Amended and Supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is
served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon
the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20
days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original
pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended
pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court
otherwise orders.
Rule 56. Summary Judgment
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from
the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon
all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to
all or any part thereof.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four (4) copies of Brief
of Appellant were served by mailing delivery, first-class,
postage pre-paid, by depositing the same with the United
States Postal Service, on the
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Phillip W. Dyer
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

k/mi/Taylor.cer/APPl

1

